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EEC Commission Investigation
Procedures in Competition Cases
The legal powers of the Commission of the European Economic Commu-
nity in competition cases have in recent years increasingly come under pub-
lic scrutiny. A striking feature of this increase in interest is that it is not the
substantive application of the law, the Commission's interpretation of Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, that has been the focus of attention, but
rather the Commission's procedural powers and practices that have been
the subject of criticism. In particular, members of the European Parliament
have entered into an active dialogue with the Commission on this subject
by means of written and oral questions.
The Damseaux Report' drawn up on behalf of the European Parliament,
emphasized the fundamental role which competition policy can play in
ensuring the Community's economic and social well-being. However, in
paragraph 20, it also put forward recommendations aimed at simplifying
procedures on restrictive practices so as to preserve the credibility and effec-
tiveness of competition policy.
In the debate on the Parliament's resolution of the report, Mr. Hopper
deplored the fact that the rules governing the Commission's powers of
investigation were not in all cases fair and comprehensible. He called for a
strengthening of the safeguards available to the businesses being investi-
gated. Criticizing the fact that the Commission combined the role of inves-
tigator, prosecutor and judge, he argued that a special appeals procedure
should be established which would allow a check on "whether the Commis-
sion has conducted a proper investigation and taken proper account of all
factual matters." 2
Lady Elles raised the matter of the procedures for implementing Article
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14 of Council Regulation No. 17/623 in a Written Question to the Commis-
sion in October 1979,4 and asked further questions on this matter in Janu-
ary 1980. 5 In February 1980, Mr. Newton Dunn asked the Commission to
list the investigations which it was presently making into restrictive prac-
tices and abuse of dominant positions within the Community.
6
At the European Parliament's session on May 19, 1980 Mr. Ansquer put
an oral question to the Commission. He wanted to know the Commission's
view of the position taken by Community industrialists that the procedures
followed in the matter of agreements and dominant positions should be
reviewed. 7 This question was obviously a reference to a memorandum to
the Commission drawn up by the Union of Industries of the European
Community (UNICE) in February 1980 on "EEC Procedures in Competi-
tion Cases," in which Commission procedures were strongly criticized.
Similar criticism also came from other quarters. In addition to UNICE,
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Bar
Association (IBA), the Consultative Committee of Bar Associations of the
European Community (CCBE) and professional associations representing
legal advisers in the United Kingdom, such as the Law Society, addressed
memoranda to the Commission on questions relating to procedures in com-
petition cases. These memoranda and the UNICE memorandum are all
broadly similar in the points they make: the Commission and the Court of
Justice have wrongly affirmed the administrative character of competition
case procedures, too little attention is given to accuracy and fairness, inves-
tigative activities and consultative procedures in the Directorate General
for Competition are inadequate, and improvements must therefore be made
in the procedural rules. The UNICE memorandum also proposed that an
administrative board should be set up, consisting of officials who, while
technically belonging to the Commission, would as far as possible be
independent of the commission and of the Directorate General for Compe-
tition in particular, and whose job it would be to act in an advisory capacity
so as to ensure that the procedures pursued by the Directorate General for
Competition were subject to some degree of monitoring and achieved a
higher degree of objectivity.
In July 1980, Mrs. Watz, referring to the UNICE memorandum, asked
which of industry's proposals to change current practices were compatible
with Community Law and what the Commission's assessment was of the
suggestion that the results of inquiries by the Directorate General for Com-
petition should be reviewed by an independent agency.8 The Commission
rejected the criticism made of its administrative practice. In its comments
'OJ No. 13, Feb. 21, 1962, at 204; Article 14 sets out the Commission's powers to carry out
investigations into businesses. This question will have to be looked at more closely below.4Written Question No. 677/79, OJ C 310, Dec. 10, 1979, at 30.
'Written Question No. 1474/79, OJ C 98, Apr. 21, 1980, at 31.
6Written Question No. 1740/79, OJ C 140, June 10, 1980, at 14.
7Debates of the European Parliament, No. 1-256, May 1980, at 35.
'Written Question No. 840/80, OJ C 283, Nov. 3, 1980, at 41.
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on the Damseaux Report, it stated that the procedures laid down by Coun-
cil Regulation No. 17 were just and balanced. The proposal for a separa-
tion between the power to establish the facts and the power to formulate a
legal assessment of such facts could not be implemented without changes in
the institutional system and in Community Law.9
In its answers to various Parliamentary questions, the Commission reiter-
ated this position and argued against efforts to bring about fundamental
changes in the nature of the administrative procedure by means of meas-
ures to delay proceedings or curtail powers to carry out investigations. The
Commission declared that it would, on the other hand, continue its efforts
to improve the practical application of its procedural rules wherever this
was possible and desirable, particularly in light of the views of the Court of
Justice and the suggestions by interested parties.' 0
There are various possible causes of the criticism of the Commission's
administrative practices and of the associated proposals for changes in the
procedural rules. There is reason to suspect that interested parties may be
endeavoring to weaken the Commission's powers and thus to make it diffi-
cult to act against violations of the competition rules. This would be a good
time for such a campaign, since it is in periods of persistent economic reces-
sion that doubts as to the sense and purpose of competition policy most
readily find an audience. However, since such critics can have little hope of
success in questioning the basic provisions of the Treaty, among which the
competition rules set out in Articles 85 and 86 must be included, their aim
must be to set up obstacles to the actual implementation of such provisions,
i e., in the area of investigations and fact-finding activities. The negative
impact on effective action against competition violations would then essen-
tially be the same. At least some of the proposals put forward by industry
and the legal profession would-intentionally or unintentionally-
encourage such a situation.
Another possible cause, which must be taken considerably more seri-
ously, lies in the fundamental differences in legal thinking among Member
States. It is surely no coincidence that most of the criticism, and the harsh-
est criticism, comes from countries whose tradition is based on the common
law. Their criticisms may derive from a strong feeling for fairness, legal
protection and legal certainty in public or official intervention measures-a
feeling which has traditionally developed along different lines from that in
most of the continental European countries. However, criticism based on
such considerations would be justified only if the Commission's powers
were too far-reaching, were not subject to any effective control, and were
exercised inappropriately. The Commission's practice in carrying out
investigations shows, however, that this is not the case.
'Debates of the European Parliament, No. 1-253, at 57.
"Debates of the European Parliament (Question by Mr. Ansquer), No. 1-256, at 39 and
OJC 283, Nov. 3, 1980, at 41 (Question by Mrs. Walz).
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Lastly, a problem which must not be underestimated and a possible cause
of some of the criticism is the lack of general public knowledge of the Com-
mission's tasks, powers and procedures. The position may be different in
individual Member States, such as the Federal Republic of Germany,
where the Federal Cartel Office I and a specialized section of the legal pro-
fession have ensured that there is a large degree of awareness on the part of
businesses.' 2 However, this is much less the case in most of the other Mem-
ber States. This lack of knowledge and understanding sometimes leads
people to overreact, to misinterpret and to give vent to excessive criticism.
Although the procedural rules laid down by Council Regulation No. 17
have been in force for more than twenty years, and although the Director-
ate General for Competition has carried out numerous investigations in all
the Member States of the Community, this lack of familiarity is nonetheless
understandable. Investigation procedures must as a matter of principle
avoid the glare of publicity, since no one should be publicly accused of a
violation of the law so long as no proof or reliable evidence is available. In
carrying out its investigations, the Commission is obliged to safeguard the
justified interests and business secrets of the businesses being investigated
and to protect other firms that have lodged informal complaints or may be
involved in quasiwitnesses 13 against possible reprisals by their competitors
or suppliers. Consequently, most of the investigation procedures are car-
ried out under cover of confidentiality and secrecy, and a lack of public
information must therefore be accepted as inevitable.
At the same time, it cannot be denied that the more the general public
knows about investigations, the greater will be its understanding of the
investigative power of the antitrust authority. This is true not only at the
national level, but even more so in the case of an international authority
which, because of economic, social and linguistic differences among the
Member States-differences which are in some cases considerable-has to
rely on achieving the broadest possible consensus on the part of the persons
affected by its actions. Without this consensus, which must be derived from
knowledge and understanding, the Community's competition policy cannot
work in the long run.
The following sections will accordingly outline the legal bases for the
Commission's powers of investigation, the main problems arising in prac-
tice in carrying out investigation procedures, and the questions involved in
cooperation with the Member States.
"Mention should be made here of the Federal Cartel Office's reports on its activities.
2See GRUTZNER, RICHTIGES VERHALTEN BEI KARTELLAMTS-ERMITTLUNGEN IM
UNTERNEHMEN, 2d ed. 1978 (EEC procedures, points 212 et seq.); HERMANNS, DIE ERMIT-
TLUNGSBEFUGNISSE DER KARTELLBEHORDEN NACH DEUTSCHEM UND EUROPAISCHEM RECHT
1978 (EEC procedures, at 121 et seq.)
'
3The Commission has no legal power to examine witnesses.
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I. The Legal Bases for Commission Investigative Powers
Article 213 of the Treaty provides that "the Commission may, within the
limits and under the conditions laid down by the Council in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty, collect any information and carry out any
checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it." Article
87(1) of the Treaty gives the Council, as the Community's legislative
authority, the task of adopting "any appropriate regulations or directives to
give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86."
On February 6, 1962, the Council, acting on the basis of this authoriza-
tion, adopted the "First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty," otherwise known as Regulation No. 17.14 This regulation has
remained substantially unchanged since it became effective on March 13,
1962.15
The Preamble to Regulation No. 17 provides as follows:
[I]n order to secure uniform application of Articles 85 and 86 in the common
market, rules must be made under which the Commission, acting in close and
constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States, may take
the requisite measures for applying those Articles; for this purpose the Commis-
sion must have the cooperation of the competent authorities of the Member States
and be empowered, throughout the common market, to require such information
to be supplied and to undertake such investigations as are necessary to bring to
light any agreement, decision or concerted practice prohibited by Article 85(1) or
any abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 86; compliance with Arti-
cles 85 and 86 and the fulfillment of obligations imposed on undertakings and
associations of undertakings under this Regulation must be enforceable by means
of fines and periodic penalty payments ...
The key provisions regarding the Commission's powers of investigation
are contained in Articles 11, 12, 13, 14 and 20 of Regulation No. 17. The
investigating powers of the Commission (Article 14) and its right to infor-
mation (Article 11) have proved to be by far the most important means of
inquiry, with the right of investigation, which constitutes the most direct
means of intervention in the business and industrial world, also proving to
be the one most fraught with problems.
The power to carry out inquiries into sectors of the economy (sectoral
inquiries, Article 12) and the Commission's right to have investigations car-
ried out at its request by the authorities of the Member States (Article 13)
have so far been of no practical significance, since the Commission has not
made, or has not been able to make, very much use of them. This issue will
be discussed further below. The protection of businesses involved in inves-
tigations is covered by the provisions of Article 20 of Regulation No. 17.
Under this Article, information which the Commission has acquired in the
1
4 OJ No. 13, Feb. 21, 1962, at 204; English Special Edition 1959-1962; at 87.
"
5Such changes as have been made do not affect the provisions concerning powers of investi-
gation. On this question, and on the background to the adoption of the Regulation, see
GROEBEN, BoEcKH & THIFSINo, EWG-VERTrAo, 2d ed., preliminary remarks on Regulation
No. 17, at 813 elseq.
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exercise of its powers of investigation may be used only for the purposes of
the investigation and may not be disclosed if it is covered by the obligation
of professional secrecy. The enforceability of the investigating powers
vested in the Commission is ensured by the provisions regarding fines and
periodic penalty payments (Article 15 and 16 of Regulation No. 17). Fines
may be imposed in particular where businesses supply incorrect informa-
tion, produce books or other business records in incomplete form, or refuse
to submit to an investigation ordered by Commission decision.
The Commission is also entitled to impose periodic penalty, payments in
order to compel businesses to supply information which it has requested by
decision and to submit to an investigation which it has similarly ordered by
decision. Commission decisions on in ,estigation measures may be con-
tested through the institution of proceedings before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (Article 173 of the EEC Treaty). The Court of
Justice also has unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 of
the EEC Treaty to review Commission decisions on fines or periodic pen-
alty payments (Article 17 of Regulation No. 17).
II. Investigative Practices of the Commission
A. Initiation of Procedure and Initial Measures
Basically, the initiation of an investigation procedure by the Commission
is not required to follow any particular lines. 16 Generally speaking, the
procedure is initiated when Directorate A (which is responsible for investi-
gations and inspections) in the Directorate General for Competition asks
one or more of its officials to undertake inquiries into a particular case. The
possible reasons for initiating an investigation vary enormously and may be
listed roughly as follows, in order of importance:
1. Questions by members of the European Parliament. In accordance
with its own house rules, the Commission normally answers these
within five days. If the question relates to a case requiring lengthy
investigations, a preliminary answer is given to the member and the
final information made known after the investigations have been
concluded.
2. Applicatons for termination of infringements under Article 3 of Regu-
lation No. 17. These give applicants (Member States or persons who
claim a legitimate interest) a legal right to action by the Community.
If the Commission does not take action, the applicant may lodge a
complaint to the Court of Justice in accordance with the third para-
graph of Article 175 of the EEC Treaty.' 7
3. Notifications or informal complaints concerning distortions of compe-
tition, particularly in cases where those making the notification or
'
6The only exception is inquiries into sectors of the economy (sectoral inquiries) pursuant to
Article 12 of Regulation No. 17. In such cases, a Commission decision is required.
"See GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 856 et seq. with further bibliographical references.
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complaint could suffer substantial damage through competition
infringements committed by others unless the Commission took rapid
action.
4. Applications for negative clearance under Article 2 of Regulation No.
17 and for exemption decisions pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EEC
Treaty in conjunction with Article 6 of Regulation No. 17.
5. The Commission acting on its own initiative to start a procedure.
6. Suggestions, notifications or recommendations made by authorities in
the Member States, by other Commission departments or by any other
party.
If the reasons for instigating investigation procedures are reclassified by
frequency, the picture is different. Up to the end of 1981, a total of 4365
cases involving procedures under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty had
been dealt with by the Commission. Of these, 3882 concerned notifications
(with the object of exemption, predominantly licensing agreements), 250
related to formal or informal complaints addressed to the Commission and
233 concerned proceedings on the Commission's own initiative. I8 There
has been little if any change in this pattern since then.
The first steps taken in connection with an investigation procedure are
usually purely internal matters within the Commission. The Commission
official responsible for the case will initially attempt to clarify the facts
without making use of the powers available under Regulation No. 17. For
this purpose, use may be made of the documentation department operating
in the Directorate General for Competition, market studies carried out on
behalf of the Commission, documentation on notifications of existing agree-
ments, decisions and practices of individual undertakings and the results
and findings produced by other investigation procedures, whether com-
pleted or uncompleted. It may also be useful to contact other Commission
departments, national authorities and non-Community countries. If after
assessment of the information thus obtained it is still suspected that a viola-
tion of the competition rules is involved, consideration is given to the means
of inquiry appropriate to clarify the facts. The Commission is legally free
here to make use of whichever powers it wishes for this purpose. In particu-
lar, it is not obliged to begin by sending a request for information and to
continue its inquiries by means of investigations only if its requests for
information have not produced the necessary data.' 9 This view was con-
firmed by the Court of Justice in its judgment of June 26, 1980 in Case 136/
79 (National Panosonic (UK) Ltd v. Commission). The Court held that the
right to information and the power to carry out investigations involved two
"See Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (1981) point 69.
"This argument may be found in GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, op. cit., at 949 with
further bibliographical references. A different view is taken by Wohlfarth, Everling, Glaesner
& Sprung, Art. 213, note 3, by THOMA, EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFr, 1960, at 423, 430, and by
LIETZMANN, WuW 1957, at 368, all of whom assume that the right of investigation is subsidi-
ary to the request for information.
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mutually independent procedures serving different purposes. The choice
between the two methods of inquiry should be made in the light of the
circumstances of each individual case. 20
However, where the purpose of the inquiry permits, and in particular
where immediate action in the form of an investigation does not appear to
be called for in the light of the facts of the case, the Commission will begin
by requesting information. In so doing, it is acting in accordance with the
legal principle of keeping intervention to a minimum, since requests for
information are usually the mildest form of intervention in the business and
industrial sphere.
B. Requests for Information
Article 11(1) of Regulation No. 17 states that, in carrying out the duties
assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions adopted under Article 87 of
the Treaty, the Commission may obtain all necessary information from the
Governments and competent authorities of the Member States and from
businesses and associations of businesses. In its request for information, the
Commission must state the legal basis and the purpose of the request, as
well as the penalties which may be imposed for supplying incorrect infor-
mation (Article 11(3) of Regulation No. 17).
1. THOSE REQUIRED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION
The first point to be borne in mind is that the obligation to supply infor-
mation applies to all businesses and associations of businesses. It therefore
also applies to businesses that are not considered to have infringed the com-
petition rules.2' This rule is justified and necessary, since practice has
shown that information obtained from third parties (mostly competitors,
suppliers or customers of the businesses that are under suspicion) is an
important source of evidence in uncovering or proving violations of Articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
2. PURPOSE AND NECESSITY
Problems sometimes arise in connection with requests for information
where the purpose and necessity of the information have not been made
sufficiently clear.
The purpose of the information requested is determined by the tasks
assigned to the Commission, namely, to ensure that the competition rules
laid down in the Treaty are implemented and observed. The Commission
can accordingly obtain information for the purpose of exercising all the
powers which Community law in competition cases has vested in it. 22 In the
request for information, it must therefore be made clear that the Commis-
"°See publication in 29 COMMON MARKET LAW REPORTS, Part 258, at 182 et seq.
"General view; see GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 925 with further references.
"See Mestmacker, Europaisches Weubewerbsrecbt, 1974, at 598.
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sion is acting in the exercise of one of these powers. These may be proceed-
ings on suspicion of violations of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty,
proceedings to examine whether conditions are such as to allow negative
clearance or an exemption decision, or proceedings in connection with the
imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments. The main point is that
the information requested must relate to a specific set of facts. The Com-
mission must therefore have sufficient evidence to support its supposition
that a violation has been committed; this means that applications for nega-
tive clearance or an exemption decision must have been submitted or there
must be a presumption of actions liable to fines or periodic penalty
payments.
Requests for information that are purely precautionary or solely for doc-
umentary purposes would be improper.23 It is not necessary for the Com-
mission, by way of explanation of the purpose of its request for
information, to disclose what facts and information it already possesses and
why this particular information is therefore being requested from this par-
ticular business. Otherwise the Commission would in most cases be forced
to break the rule of confidentiality applying in investigation procedures and
thus to damage the interests of businesses that are under suspicion or other
businesses indirectly involved.
A further question is whether the information requested is necessary to
achieve the purpose pursued. The two criteria of "purpose" and "neces-
sity" are closely linked since the purpose pursued serves as the criterion in
determining necessity. The Commission must be allowed a wide discretion
in assessing this link.24
A request for information cannot therefore be regarded as improper sim-
ply because the relevant business considers the information requested to be
irrelevant to the purpose pursued or because it believes the information
does not lend itself to the drawing of certain factual conclusions or the
deduction of certain legal consequences. If the purpose of the request falls
within the framework of existing powers, the necessity of the request cannot
be denied by reference to an a priori assessment of the results expected,
since these may change-precisely as a result of the information obtained. 25
In addition, the principle of proportionality of means, a principle which
also governs the Commission's administrative activities, is reflected in the
"necessity" criterion. The Court of Justice accordingly looks to see
whether, having regard to the circumstances, requests for information are
"excessive and disproportionate to the aim in view." Despite the broad
measure of discretion available to the High Authority, measures have to be
examined to see whether they have exceeded the boundaries of what is
"General view; see GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, op cit., at 923 with further references.
2
'Judgment of Apr. 4, 1960, Case 31/59, Acciaieria de Brescia v. High Authority [1960] ECR
on the application of Article 47 of the ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] Treaty;
these principles may also be applied in interpreting Art. II of Regulation No. 17.
"S[1960] ECR, op. cit.
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permitted.26
That leaves open the question of whether the boundaries of a justified
end-means relationship are exceeded. The question of whether the nature
and extent of the request for information are proportionate to the aim in
view can probably be answered only in the light of circumstances in each
individual case, taking into consideration the expense caused to those
required to provide the information, the disruption of business, etc. 27
At any rate, the Commission should always take care to state the grounds
for its requests for information as thoroughly as possible and to pinpoint
the information requested precisely. This will ease the task of supplying the
information, and also allow the business no excuse for providing evasive
answers that would only require additional measures.
The time limits should be determined after considering the urgency of the
case and the anticipated expenditure. Experience has shown that an inves-
tigation whose inherent justification is not immediately obvious merely
tends to reinforce businesses' latent reluctance to accept the Commission's
powers. Lastly, careful drafting of the request for information and ade-
quate statement of the relevant grounds are matters of some legal signifi-
cance, because the requests more or less predetermines any decision
requiring the information to be supplied under the terms of Article 11(5) of
Regulation No. 17. Because of the two-stage nature of the procedure, only
such information can be required by decision as has already been specified
in the initial request.
If the request does not comply with the legal requirements, its shortcom-
ings cannot be made good by any subsequent mandatory decision.28 So far,
the Commission seems for the most part to have met these requirements,
since information decisions under Article 11(5) of Regulation No. 17 have
been necessary in only eleven cases. 29
3. REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS
The Commission's practice has increasingly been not only to request
information as such, but at the same time to ask that the relevant docu-
2 6Judgment of Dec. 14, 1962 joined cases 5 to 11 and 13 to 15/62, Acciaieria San Michele v.
High Authority, 11962] ECR.
"This view is also taken by Mestmacker, op. cii., at 601.
28See Mestmacker, op. cit., at 597; GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, op. cii., at 930; Deringer,
Das Wettbewerbsrecht der Europaischen Wirtschafzsgemeinschaft, Regulation No. 17, Art. 11,
note 17.
2 Decision of Feb. 23, 1966 (unpublished); Decision of Feb. 1, 1971 (CICG-ZVEI/ZPU),
OJ L 34, Feb. il, 1971; three Decisions of June 18, 1971 (Brasserie Esperance, Union des
Brasseries and Brasserie Maes) OJ L 161, July 19, 1971; Decision of July 2, 1971 (Asphaltoid-
Keller), OJ L 161, July 19, 1971; Decision of Nov. 9, 1971 (Societa Italiana degli Autori ed
Editori), OJ L 254, Nov. 17, 1971; two Decisions of Sept. 28, 1972 (Rodenstock and Misal), OJ
L 267, Nov. 18, 1972; Decision of June 25, 1976 (CSV), OJ L 192, July 16, 1976; Decision of
May 26, 1978 (RAI/Unitel) OJ L 157, June 15, 1978.
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ments be handed over. 30
This can take on considerable proportions in individual cases. The ques-
tion arises whether such requests on the part of the Commission are covered
by Article 11 of Regulation No. 17.
In the literature, ordering documents to be handed over is regarded as
unlawful.3 ' The wording of the provision does not stipulate what type or
nature of information may be requested, i e., whether it must be supplied in
the form of a statement or whether it must also involve, where appropriate,
the handing over of documents. However, no problems have arisen so far
in this area. There is no known instance of a business refusing to hand over
documents to the Commission in connection with information requested.
The evident acquiescence of businesses in the Commission's practice here is
no doubt based on the realization that simultaneous requests for documents
can obviate the need for investigations of the business and are therefore in
the interests of both parties in simplifying the procedure.
4. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY INFORMATION
So far, the Commission has not recognized that businesses have a right to
refuse to supply the information requested. The European Parliament did
propose that businesses should have the right to refuse to supply informa-
tion where there was a danger of self-incrimination, but this was not
included in Regulation No. 17.32 Some authors take the view that such a
right forms part of the common historical and legal tradition on which the
constitutions of the Member States are founded, and must therefore be
taken into account irrespective of any actual legal provisions to this effect.
33
Where reference is made in this context to Section 46(5) of the German
Law prohibiting Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerb-
sbeschrankungen), 34 opinions differ as to whether the wording of this provi-
sion is such as to allow businesses to invoke it. 35
At all events, no comparable rule can be found elsewhere in commercial
law of the Member States. Consequently, any reference to national law
"E.g., Decision of July 2, 1971 (Asphaltoid-Keller), OJ L 161, July 19, 1971; Decision of
June 25, 1976 (CSV), OJ L 192, July 16, 1976.
a1GLISS & HIRSCH, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-KARTELLRECHT, 3d ed. 1978, at 489, point 22.
"This proposal stated that persons required to supply information should be able to refuse
to do so where answering the questions would expose them, or a person connected with them
and entitled under the national code of procedure to refuse to give evidence, or the business or
business associations represented by them, to the danger of criminal prosecution. See opinion
of the European Parliament, Oct. 19, 1961, art. 9 (4).
"See EVERLING, BB 1961, at 423, and Deringer, Regulation No. 17, Art. 11, Note 13.
'Section 46(5) of the law prohibiting restrictions on competition states that persons required
to supply information may refuse to do so where answering the questions would expose them,
or a person connected with them and specified in section 383(1) to (3) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to the danger of criminal prosecution or proceedings under the Law concerning
Administrative Irregularities.
"This view is taken in JUNGE GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR, 3d ed., point 46, note 10 and
by Hermanns, op. cit., at 121 etseq. A different interpretation is given by, e.g., Langen, GWB,
paragraph 46, point 10.
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would entail discrimination on the grounds of nationality.36 These differ-
ences in the legal position of the Member States thus invalidate the assump-
tion of a general principle of Community Law from which an unwritten
right of refusal might be inferred.
In the literature, the view is taken that other private-law rights to refuse
to supply information must be admitted, for example in order to protect
commercial and industrial secrets 37 or on the ground that the party con-
cerned cannot reasonably be expected to supply the information. 38 In Eng-
land, the Law Society and the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar
proposed in 1976 that Articles 11, 12 and 14 of Regulation No. 17 should
provide for a right to refuse to supply information or to release documents
where "the documents, or part of the documents, or the information
requested, would disclose technical or commercial secrets, the disclosure of
which to any source (even with the protection of Article 20) would cause
great harm to the business, and the Commission has failed to show that
they are sufficiently material to justify disclosure."' 39 These views are not
supported in existing Community law.
Article 214 of the EEC Treaty states that the officials and other servants
of the Community shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not
to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional
secrecy, in particular information about businesses, their activities or their
cost components. This requirement was restated in Article 20 of Regulation
No. 17 in respect of information acquired as a result of the application of
the Regulation. It follows that even commercial and professional secrets
are subject to the obligation to supply information, since their secrecy is
ensured by the legal obligations incumbent upon the Commission's staff.40
The same obligation applies to refusals based on professional secrecy
imposed by contractual secrecy requirements, as in the case of trust
companies.41
In one instance, a business refused to hand over the documents the Com-
mission asked for in a request for information, on the ground that this
could be regarded by the Swiss authorities as a punishable act under Article
273 of the Swiss Penal Code. The Commission determined that this was
not a reason for refusal, since the information was available within the
community and since the Commission's officials were abound by profes-
sional secrecy. In addition, the information requested had already been
made accessible to an international cartel established in Switzerland and
36See Thiesing in Wurdinger/ Wohlfarth, at 68 et seq.
"See THOMA, EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT, 1960, at 423.
38See Deringer, Regulation No. 17, Art. 11, note II.
3 9Unpublished memorandum by the Law Reform Committees of the Council of the Law
Society and the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar on Investigatory Procedures of the
Commission under Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Regulation No. 17, March 1976, figure 25(c).
'"See Mestmacker, op. cit., at 603; GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 927.
4 See Commission Decision of Jan. 31, 1979 (Fides), OJ L 57, Mar. 8, 1979, at 33.
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could not be exempted from the Commission's right of information.42
III. Investigations
Article 14(1) of Regulation No. 17 states: "In carrying out the duties
assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions adopted under Article 87 of
the Treaty, the Commission may undertake all necessary investigations into
businesses and business associations. To this end the officials authorized by
the Commission are empowered:
1. to examine the books and other business records;
2. to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
3. to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
4. to enter any premises, land and means of transport of businesses."
A. General Problems
The right to carry out investigations is probably the most fraught with
problems and also the most frequently criticized of the Commission's pow-
ers of investigation. There are several reasons for this. Direct interventions
by the State in business and industrial affairs, even at the national level, are
felt to be irksome and are often regarded as an encroachment of State
power. This must be assumed to be even more the case when it comes to
accepting investigations by officials of the Commission, since people feel
the authority of an international body to be much more remote than that of
their national institutions.
Too little knowledge of the tasks and powers of the Commission and of
the rights and duties of businesses is also a factor. Even today, there are
still industrialized regions in the Community and indeed fairly large firms
which have only a vague idea of the Commission's powers and tasks with
regard to competition policy. This applies particularly to countries in
which competition policy and the antitrust authorities play a relatively low-
key role in the area of government activities.
A further consideration is that investigations frequently represent a busi-
ness' first direct and, in most cases, unwelcome contact with representatives
of the Brussels authorities. It is therefore understandable that the Commis-
sion's authority is initially measured in terms of the manner and behavior
of its officials. However, an equally understandable aspect is the inclination
of some firms, at any rate those suspected of having violated the rules of
competition, to frustrate the success of the investigation as far as possible.
Although it is relatively rare for businesses thus to try to evade their duty
to cooperate in investigations, as provided for in Article 14 of Regulation
No. 17, this does show that investigations differ from requests for informa-
tion in the way they are regarded by those concerned. This places a special
responsibility on the officials of the Directorate-General for Competition
2See Decision of June 25, 1976 (CSV), OJ L 192, July 16, 1976.
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who are charged with carrying out investigations. Through their responsi-
bility to carry out checks, they exercise extensive powers in the name of the
Commission and must do so with tact, fairness, patience and persistence.
Since the Commission's investigative procedures involve at least two Com-
munity countries, and indeed frequently involve all of them, language bar-
riers must be overcome and differences in the organization of businesses, in
commercial and company law and in the economic structure of the individ-
ual Member States must be taken into account. These are factors which
play little if any role in investigations at the national level. The task of
reacting appropriately during an investigation to these not always foresee-
able differences in the conditions relating to businesses imposes additional
demands on the professional experience and skills of the Commission's offi-
cials. Meeting these demands is a basic precondition governing the extent
to which: (1) investigations are successfully carried out, and (2) the Com-
mission is supplied with objective and reliable findings enabling it to exer-
cise its powers properly and appropriately.
B. Investigations Backed by Authorization in Writing
Article 14(2) of Regulation No. 17 provides as follows: "The officials of
the Commission authorized for the purpose of these investigations shall
exercise their powers upon production of an authorization in writing speci-
fying the subject matter and purpose of the investigation and the penalties
provided for in Article 15(l)(c) in cases where production of the required
books or other business records is incomplete. In good time before the
investigation, the Commission shall inform the competent authority of the
Member State in whose territory the same is to be made of the investigation
and of the identity of the authorized officials."
1. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
A prerequisite for carrying out investigations is the approval of the Com-
mission Member responsible for competition questions. This is a formal
requirement, since for the purposes of implementation in individual
instances, the Commission's powers under Article 14 are transferred
directly and in a personal capacity to an official.
If Directorate A, which is responsible for inspections, considers that an
investigation is necessary, it proposes to the Director-General that one
should be carried out, giving the reasons for its proposal. The Director-
General informs the Commissioner responsible for competition, who
authorizes the Director-General to sign the inspection orders. Directorate
A then informs the relevant antitrust authority or authorities in whose terri-
tory investigations are to be carried out.
In so doing, it briefly describes the reasons for the intended investigation
and provides other relevant information (time and place of the investiga-
tion, Commission official or officials who will carry it out). In general, it is
left to the discretion of the national antitrust authorities to decide whether
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they wish to send their own officials to accompany the Commission officials;
some Member States always do so, others do so occasionally and others
almost never. More will be said on this below.
2. PRIOR NOTIFICATION
Businesses are usually notified in advance, mostly by telephone, of inves-
tigations involving authorizations. There are practical reasons for this.
Since businesses are not obliged to submit to ordinary investigations,
advance notification prevents a situation where Commission officials arrive
to find no responsible representative of the businesses on hand to decide
whether the business is prepared to submit to the investigation. Even if, as
in the case of many large businesses, there is normally no reason to antici-
pate such a situation, it ensures that the business is enabled to make the
necessary preparations to minimize the length and scope of the
investigation.
Consequently, the Commission official responsible for the inquiry will, in
notifying the business, outline the basic purpose of the inspection. How-
ever, it is scarcely possible at this stage to provide more detailed informa-
tion, since the nature and number of the documents to be checked can only
rarely be specified in advance. Frequently, it is only during the investiga-
tion that it emerges which documents are important and which (perhaps
contrary to previous assumptions) can be dispensed with. The fact that the
information given in the notification is mostly rather scanty does not mean
therefore that businesses are deliberately being kept in the dark.
3. AUTHORIZATIONS
The officials charged with the inspection must produce their written
authorization upon arrival, normally to a person authorized to represent the
business (member of the board, manager, or authorized signatory). While
authorization to represent the business is not a legal prerequisite for the
lawfulness of an investigation, in practice, in most cases it is essential in
order to ensure that consent to the investigation is not given by a person
who is not authorized to do so.
The drafting of the authorizations is sometimes criticized by businesses
and lawyers. The main criticism has been that the authorization did not
state clearly enough of what the relevant business was being accused. A
further criticism is that the object and purpose of the inquiry were not
described sufficiently precisely. Lastly, it has been asked that the nature of
the documents to be checked should be described in enough detail to allow
them to be traced without difficulty.43
In the literature, 44 it is suggested that details should be given of the books
4
3See Law Society Memorandum, March 1976, figure 24.
"See GLEISS & HIRSCH, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-KARTELLRECHT, 3d ed. 1978, Article 14
of Regulation No. 17, point 9.
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and business records to be examined. This, it is argued, is because busi-
nesses must know exactly which records are to be checked, since, if the
drafting is vague or too general, businesses run the risk of violating the
requirement that records to be produced in complete form, an offense
which renders them liable to a fine. It is argued that it is up to the Commis-
sion to decide precisely which documents it wishes to check and then to
specify these in the authorization. At the very least, the authorization
should make clear the period and the subject matter to which the docu-
ments to be checked relate. Where authorizations are drafted in vague
terms, no fine should be imposed (it is argued) for violation of the require-
ment that books and records be produced in complete form. Those making
such demands do, however, misinterpret a number of the basic practical
aspects of investigations.
Article 14(2) of Regulation No. 17 states that the officials of the Commis-
sion authorized for the purpose of investigations shall exercise their powers
upon production of an authorization in writing specifying the subject mat-
ter and purpose of the investigation. It further stipulates that, in good time
before the investigation, the Commission shall inform the competent
national authority of the intended investigation and of the identity of the
authorized officials. Since the authorization is issued personally to a partic-
ular official, it states expressly that he is authorized to exercise the powers
set out in Article 14(1) of Council Regulation No. 17 of February 6, 1962.
Thus, the authorization shows that the official is entitled to carry out
investigation activities pursuant to Article 14, and is therefore primarily in
the nature of an evidence of authority. The criticism that authorizations do
not state clearly enough what the relevant business is accused of is probably
based in practice not so much on a feeling that the Commission is carrying
out investigations without sufficient grounds for suspicion, but rather on the
objection that the business cannot perceive clearly enough exactly why it is
to be investigated.
However, it must be borne in mind that, at the investigation stage, there
is basically as yet no charge of any violation of the law. This can be seen
most clearly in cases where a third party, ie., a business that is not involved
in any agreements or concerted practices, or that is not in a dominant posi-
tion, is affected by the investigation. It also applies in other instances, how-
ever. The purpose of investigative procedures is to provide the Commission
with objective knowledge of the facts. The aim is to explore all the circum-
stances, both those which tend to corroborate the suspicion that a violation
has been committed and those which might invalidate it. Otherwise, the
Commission would not be able to form an opinion, based on facts, as to
whether it should initiate, continue or terminate a procedure. To that
extent, investigative actions must be unbiased. At the most, therefore, the
authorization to investigate, in the sense of seeking confirmation, can be
based on a generally formulated suspicion, whose validity can be proved
only on the basis of the results of the investigation. With regard to the
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question of what purpose the investigation may pursue, the criteria are the
same as in the case of requests for information. The authorization must
therefore make it clear that the investigation is being carried out within the
framework or with the objective of exercising one of the powers vested in
the Commission in competition matters. In most cases, this will be an
inquiry because of suspected violations of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, but it may also involve one of the other procedures provided for in
Regulation No. 17. 4 5
It is sufficient therefore to refer in the authorization to the rules whose
applicability is being considered.
Critisicm that the authorizations do not define the object of the investiga-
tion clearly enough must be appraised on a case-by-case basis. In principle,
the business has a justified interest in being able to see from the written
authorization which of its economic and entrepreneurial activities are to be
subject to an investigation. This means that there must be as precise as
possible a description of the market, products or services and of the associ-
ated activities (manufacture, marketing, supply of a particular market or
particular group of customers, cooperation with competitors, export organi-
zations, etc.).
At the same time, there are limits to the information which can be pro-
vided. It must not jeopardize the purpose of the investigation or the main-
tenance of confidentiality vis-A-vis competitors or other third parties.
Giving details in the authorization on the nature or number of the docu-
ments to be examined is neither necessary on legal grounds nor possible on
practical grounds.
The right of examination under Article 14(l)(a) is in substance more
comprehensive than the right to take copies under Article 14(1)(b) or the
right of information under Article 11 of Regulation No. 17. This is because
the Commission's investigating officials are often not able to judge the need
for a document for the purposes of the inquiry until they have actually seen
what it contains. The nature and number of the documents examined are
in practice never the same as the documents from which copies are taken.
It is therefore once again impossible to specify in the authorization which
individual documents will be required for the purpose of the inquiry with-
out prior knowledge of their nature and number. If these were already
known, the need for an investigation would in most cases not arise, because
the documents could be asked for at the same time as the request for infor-
mation was sent. In addition, it is not appropriate to expect the authoriza-
tions to provide a great deal of detail, since the Commission officials, before
beginning the investigation, give the business the opportunity to request
explanations on the object of the investigation.46
'
5 This view is also taken by GLEISS & HIRSCH, Op. cit., point 6.
'This is also the argument adopted by GLEISS & HIRSCH, Op. Cit., point 12; see also Eleventh
Report on Competition Policy, point 19.
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Such explanations should neither get bogged down in general discussion
of the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to the particular
case, nor should they result in the Commission officials as it were laying
their cards on the table, in a way that could jeopardize the purpose of the
investigation, before business decides whether or not it is prepared for the
investigation.
Rather, the explanations are intended to clarify questions put by the rep-
resentative of the business concerning procedural technicalities and to
avoid any misunderstandings as to the object and purpose of the investiga-
tion. If, following the explanation, the business still maintains its doubts as
to the lawfulness of the authorization, it can refuse the investigation with-
out any further statement of grounds; this is because the authorization does
not impose any obligation to submit to the investigation. Thus, considera-
tion is given to the interests of both sides. These points answer the objec-
tion sometimes made that, since the Commission, in adopting an
investigation decision, must specify the reason and which documents it
wishes to check, it could just as easily do the same in the authorization. In
contrast to requests for information, the authorization does not entail any
legal consequences.
It neither obliges the business to submit to the investigation nor binds the
Commission with regard to a subsequent decision, as in the case of Article
11 of Regulation No. 17. If the business refuses to submit to the investiga-
tion, this does not, once again in contrast to the situation with requests for
information, constitute the legal precondition for the adoption of a decision.
It is therefore neither legally necessary nor practically appropriate to treat
authorizations as prior decisions.
4. REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE INVESTIGATION
In the case of a refusal to submit to an investigation, a distinction must be
made among the following eventualities:
(a) the business refuses to submit to the investigation, with or without a
statement of its reasons for doing so. The only option then left open
to the Commission is to consider whether it should order the investi-
gation by decision under Article 14(3) of Regulation No. 17.
(b) the business declares that it is prepared to submit to the investigation,
but makes the proviso that it will not produce certain documents or
parts of documents on the grounds that they are not relevant to the
investigation. This is equivalent to a refusal since the Commission is
not bound to tolerate limited acceptance of its powers of investiga-
tion.47 In one such instance, the Commission declared that, subject
to review by the Court of Justice, it had the right to decide which
documents were important for its inquiries. Otherwise, the nature
and extent of the inquiries being made as part of an investigation
47This is the point of view also taken by GLEISS & HIRSCH, Op. ci., point 14.
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would no longer be determined by the Commission, but by the busi-
ness involved in the investigation. For the purpose of an investiga-
tion within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation No. 17, it is
essential that all documents relating to the subject of the inquiry can
be checked without any omission or exception. 48
(c) the business declares itself willing to submit to the investigation with-
out restrictions, but later does not permit the investigation to con-
tinue. This amounts to a retrospective refusal. The question then is
whether the Commission should regard the investigation as a total or
only a partial failure and, accordingly, how far a decision pursuant to
Article 14(3) should extend. This depends on the circumstances in
each individual case. As a rule, however, for reasons of clarity and
legal certainty, it will be necessary in the decision to order a full-scale
investigation.
(d) the business submits to the investigation without any reservations,
but later changes its attitude and is not willing to produce individual
business records or categories of business records, although it states
at the same time that it is prepared to submit to the continuation of
the rest of the investigation. The question here is whether this should
be regarded once again as a refusal-in this instance a retrospective
and partial one.
In one specific instance, after weighing all the circumstances, the Com-
mission did regard such a situation as amounting to a refusal. The business
concerned had initially declared that it was prepared to submit to the inves-
tigation, but subsequently stated that it would produce only business
records relating to the present, without specifying what period that covered.
The Commission officials rejected this, since their authorization did not
provide for such a restriction.
The business then dropped its objection, enabling the investigation to be
started and the business records to be examined. The next morning, the
business raised its objection again, stating that the examination could be
continued, but that it must be restricted to documents relating to the pres-
ent. The Commission officials then broke off the investigation on the
grounds that it was nonfeasible. The Commission later by decision ordered
the business to submit to the investigation, pursuant to Article 14(3) of Reg-
ulation No. 17. 4 9 However, one could also interpret this sort of behavior as
a violation of Article 15(l)(c) of Regulation No. 17. Under this provision,
the Commission can impose fines where businesses intentionally or negli-
gently produce the required books or other business records in incomplete
form during investigations under Article 14. If the business declares that it
is willing to submit to the investigation, but then withholds parts of the
required documents on the grounds that they are in its opinion not relevant
"See Decision of July 6, 1979 (AM & S Europe Ltd), OJ L 199, Aug. 7, 1979, at 31.
'
9See Decision of July 6, 1979 (AM & S Europe Ltd), op. cit.
38 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
by reason of their date or their subject matter, it is failing in its duty to
provide complete information, a duty which arises based on its declared
willingness to submit to the investigation and the express reference in the
authorization to the penalties provided for in Article 15 of Regulation No.
17. It is irrelevant whether or not the business is acting in good faith. Con-
sequently, the Commission would have the right in such cases to impose a
fine and by decision to require the business to submit to an investigation.
5. POWERS OF INVESTIGATION
If the investigation is accepted, the Commission officials are authorized:
(a) to examine the books and other business records;
(b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
(d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of businesses;
(A) The expression "books and other business records" covers all the
records which a business keeps for business purposes. The argument that it
applies only to documents covered by the obligation incumbent upon busi-
nesses to preserve business records is untenable. If that were the case,
pieces of evidence such as minutes, correspondence or internal memos on
restrictive practices could not be checked, since they are certainly not cov-
ered by any obligation to preserve them for a fixed period. In addition, in
view of the differences in Member States' national law, this criterion is
inappropriate since it would inevitably lead to discrimination on grounds of
nationality.
The records kept for business purposes in the above definition include
not only photographs, slides and films, but also magnetic tapes, other types
of sound recording media and computer programs.50
Otherwise, in view of the increasing use of electronic data processing,
microfilm, sound recording media, etc. in modern companies, the Commis-
sion's investigative powers would very soon be confined within such narrow
limits that the purpose of the investigations, i.e., to reach a comprehensive
clarification of the relevant subject matter, would be permanently affected.
In addition, there is no obvious reason why a tape recording should not be
regarded as a business record simply because it is not a written record. This
is true not only of the recording of business discussions, but also, for exam-
ple, of tape recordings which are sometimes made, at the request of the
business involved, during the investigations themselves.
In all these cases, a record open to investigation exists, even if it has not
yet been transcribed into written form. Examination of such records, par-
ticularly those produced through electronic data processing, would of
"A different view is given by GLEISS & HIRSCH, op. cit., point 17, who consider that these
are not written records and therefore argue that they cannot be considered to be business
records.
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course require special technical knowledge on the part of the Commission
officials responsible for carrying out the investigation.
(B) In the literature, 51 the view is taken that the right of investigation
extends only to the business records to be found on the business premises of
the business concerned. Papers kept outside the business premises in places
not covered by the Commission's powers of investigation, it is argued, do
not have to be brought to the business premises for examination. The
requirement that records be produced in complete form does not, it is
claimed, conflict with this view. If the Commission finds that documents
are missing, it can then request information as to whether and why such
documents are kept outside the business premises and what they contain.52
This interpretation must be rejected. It is not supported in law, since Arti-
cle 14 does not draw any distinction based on where the books and business
records are kept, but merely specifies the business premises as the places
where examination of the documents is carried out.
Consequently, even documents which at the time of the investigation,
whether by chance or intentionally, are outside the business premises are
subject to the power of investigation. If this were not the case, businesses
suspected of violating the competition rules could all too easily remove
incriminating papers temporarily so as not to have to produce them. This
could be done either by removing the papers before the commencement of
an investigation which had been announced, or by refusing to allow an
investigation to continue once it threatened to become "dangerous," thus
allowing the papers to be removed in good time before a decision. The
Commission's right of investigation would then be in danger of being
undermined.53 The fact that the Commission could request information
concerning the documents removed would be of no help. For that would
mean that the Commission could in practice carry out investigations only
with the assistance of requests for information, although both means of
inquiry are designed to meet different situations and are independent of one
another.
(C) Commission officials are authorized to ask for oral explanations on
the spot. This authority is of considerable practical importance, since inves-
tigations cannot be carried out where businesses remain "silent." In a case
dealt with in 1974, a business allowed the Commission officials unrestricted
access to its premises and also produced documents, but at the same time
categorically refused to answer any of the questions put by the Commission
officials. The Commission interpreted this as a refusal to submit to the
investigation and, in its decision, required the business, upon request, to
give oral explanations on the spot relating to the subject matter of the
"See GLEISS & HIRSCH, op. cit., point 20.
"See note 51.
"This is the conclusion reached by GROEBEN, BOECK & THIESING, at 950.
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investigation. 54
The Commission confirmed this point of view in a number of further
decisions containing orders worded in substantially the same terms.55
In its judgment of June 26, 1980,56 the Court of Justice gave a ruling on
the relationship between the right to information under Article 11 and the
right to explanations under Article 14, stating: "The fact that the officials
authorized by the Commission, in carrying out an investigation, have the
power to request during that investigation information on specific questions
arising from the books and business records which they examine is not suffi-
cient to conclude that an investigation is identical to a procedure intended
only to obtain information within the meaning of Article 11 of the
regulation."
Although this was only an incidental question in the judgment, this rul-
ing by the Court of Justice has given a more precise definition of what the
right to ask for oral explanations entails. In the Commission Decisions
referred to (see footnote 55) mentioned above, this is merely expressed in
more concise terms, but terms which amount to the same thing, since it is
only books or business records which form the object of the investigation.
However, it would be wrong and would run counter to both the letter and
the spirit of Article 14, and to the experience built up during investigations,
if the Commission officials were not allowed to ask for explanations on, for
example, the organization of the business, the products in question, the
identity of certain persons involved in the work, the nature of the book-
keeping or storage of business papers, before it had examined the docu-
ments to be checked. These are questions which must as a rule be settled
before a proper investigation (i.e., an investigation of the relevant docu-
ments within an appropriate time period and without avoidable disruption
of the business operations) can be carried out. Experience shows that inves-
tigations that do not include a fair dialogue between representatives of the
business and the Commission's officials seldom lead to objectively useful
results. Some businesses may think it fit to provide as few explanations as
possible. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that most of the inves-
tigative procedures involve complex economic facts and circumstances
whose implications are not immediately obvious to outsiders. Examples
here include questions of market definition within the meaning of Article
86 of the EEC Treaty, the marketing mechanisms for commodities that are
internationally dealt in or internationally quoted, the sales channels for
high-grade capital goods and consumer articles, etc. In most of these cases,
'Unpublished Decision of Apr. 29, 1974, IV/AF 256.
"See, for example, the unpublished Decisions of June 22, 1979, IV/AF 420 (Article 1,
und die von den genannten Beamten verlangten Erklarungen zum Gegenstand der Nach-
prufung abzugeben"); Dec. 11, 1979 IV/28.627 (Article 1, ". . . ainsi que de donner sur place
toutes les explications orales necessaires a la verification"); Nov. 26, 1980, IV/AF 465 (Article
I, ". . . and they shall give such immediate explanations relating to the subject matter of the
investigation as may be required").
"Case 136/79 (National Panasonic).
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the Commission is confronted with economic facts and circumstances
which cannot be fully elucidated by requesting information.
Where businesses behave in the above manner during investigations, this
not only results in delays, but also poses the danger of misunderstandings
and misinterpretations, which impair the objectivity and reliability of the
findings. This is in the interests neither of businesses nor of the authorities.
Consequently, the right of Commission officials to ask for oral explanations
should be put to greater use by the businesses concerned in order to help
ensure the objectivity of the inquiries.
The question of who should give the requested explanations can be
decided by the business itself. Since Commission officials do not have any
power to hear witnesses, they cannot restrict their requests for explanations
to certain persons. The persons they talk with will usually be managerial
staff authorized to represent the business. If such persons feel that they are
unable to give the explanations requested, the Commission officials will ask
them to call in employees with the relevant expert knowledge. However, if
this is refused and if a proper and correct explanation cannot therefore be
provided, this would have to be regarded as a refusal to submit to the
investigation.
The explanations given by the business may sometimes be of considera-
ble importance and must in such cases be recorded in writing. For this
purpose, the Commission officials draw up minutes in which the question is
repeated and the business is given the opportunity to state its answer or
position. The minutes are signed by the Commission officials and counter-
signed by the national official who thereby, as a neutral third party, con-
firms their accuracy. The business can refuse to sign the minutes. It then
receives a copy of them if it so wishes and if it acknowledges receipt. This
ensures that it has taken note of its explanation as recorded by the Commis-
sion officials in the minutes. If it refuses to accept even a copy, this fact is
also recorded. The questions of what evidential value the Court of Justice
would attach to such a document may for the time being be left open here.
In cases of doubt, however, minutes should always be taken so as to prevent
subsequent disagreements on the course actually taken by the investigation.
The fact that the business may not have signed the minutes does not affect
the objectivity of the statements contained in them and confirmed by the
counter-signature of the national official.
In investigations based on a written authorization, the business is free to
decide whether or not it wishes to express its views; there is no legal obliga-
tion for it to make any statement. If it refuses to do so, this is noted in the
minutes and, depending on individual circumstances, may result in the
investigation being discontinued.
A point of controversy, however, is whether the business may "lie" once
it has decided to give an explanation. One view taken in the literature is
that oral explanations given on the spot are always voluntary and cannot be
threatened with sanctions even where the investigation has been ordered by
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decision. If a requested explanation is not given or if there is reason to
suppose that it is false or incomplete, the Commission, it is argued, must
proceed by way of requests for information pursuant to Article 11.51
This view cannot be accepted. The fact of the matter is that, under Arti-
cle 15(l)(c), fines may be imposed if the required books or other business
records are not produced in complete form or if the business refuses to sub-
mit to an investigation ordered by decision. There are no explicit provi-
sions covering instances where oral explanations given on the spot are
refused or false or incomplete explanations. However, it cannot be con-
cluded from this that, though Article 14 gives the Commission the right to
ask for oral explanations, there is no corresponding obligation of businesses
to provide such explanations. If this were the case, Article 14 would be
completely without meaning.
This view is evidently not accepted by Gleiss/Hirsch either, since they
refer the Commission in this regard to the requests-for-information proce-
dure laid down in Article 11 58 However, if it were true that the provision
of oral explanations on the spot was always--even for investigations
ordered by Commission decision-merely voluntary and thus entirely up to
the business concerned, this voluntariness could not be abrogated simply by
the fact that the Commission uses the requests-for-information procedure
provided for in Article 11, even though it did not wish to request informa-
tion but merely wished to investigate documents. The conclusion must be
that this voluntariness does not exist. The business is therefore obliged, on
the basis of Article 14 alone, to provide oral explanations during the investi-
gation. If it declines to do so, this would have to be regarded as noncompli-
ance and as a refusal to submit within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of
Regulation No. 17, where the investigation has been ordered by decision. 59
It also follows from this, however, that the explanations given by the busi-
ness must be complete and correct. For, if the business explanations can be
ordered, it would be illogical if the business were then allowed to "lie,"
since this would mean that the Regulation was virtually inviting businesses
to avoid refusals by giving incomplete or false information. Once the busi-
ness has decided to cooperate in the investigation, or if it is required by
decision to submit to one, its explanations concerning the business records
must be as correct and complete as such records themselves.
This leaves the question of what happens if the business nevertheless
gives false or incomplete explanations. If the Commission officials were
misled by such explanations and as a result did not request the submission
"See GLOSS & HIRSCH, Op. cii., Article 14, point 33; what amounts to the same view is
taken by GRUTZNER, RICHTIGES VERHALTEN BEI KARTELLAMTS-ERMITrLUNGEN IM
UNTERNEHMEN, 2d ed., at 117, fig. 223; HERMANNS, DIE ERMITTLUNGSBEFUGNISSE DER
KARTELLBEHORDEN NACH DELUTSCHEM UND EUROPISCHEM RECHT Op. cit.
5
"See GLEISS & HIRSCH op. cit.
59See GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 960; Mestmacker, op. cit., at 607; Ellis-Van den
Heuvel, at 484; MAILANDER, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 3d ed., Regulation No. 17, Art.
13/14, point 88; a different view is given in Deringer, Regulation No. 17, Art. 14, note 9.
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of certain business documents important to the investigation, this would
have to be regarded as tantamount to producing the records in incomplete
form within the meaning of Article 15(l)(c) of Regulation No. 17. The situ-
ation is different where all the relevant documents have been produced, but
incorrect or incomplete explanations are given concerning the contents or
meaning of individual documents. Fines cannot be imposed in this sort of
situation; for, although Article 15(4) expressly states that decisions to
impose fines are not of a criminal law nature, such measures on the part of
the Commission are nevertheless in the nature of sanctions, and the princi-
ple that sanctions cannot be imposed by analogy would have to be observed
in favor of the businesses concerned. Here there is a lacuna in the system of
sanctions laid down in the Regulation.
(D) Under Article 14(l)(d) of Regulation No. 17, Commission officials
are authorized to enter any premises, land and means of transport of busi-
nesses. The question of whether this gives the Commission a right of search
is disputed in the literature. The answer to the question depends on
whether investigation requires a business merely to submit passively or to
cooperate in some degree. The argument that Article 14 merely requires
businesses to subihit passively but that it does not grant any right of
search6° takes account of the interests of businesses alone and is self-contra-
dictory. If it were valid, the authorities would be virtually unable to investi-
gate anything at all, since on the one hand the documents would not be
produced for them and on the other hand they would not be allowed to
search for them. According to another argument, an investigation can
achieve its purpose only if a search is carried out, since businesses, though
required to submit to investigations, are not required to collaborate actively
in them and Article 14 does not rule out the power to carry out searches.6'
However, this would place too wide a meaning on the word submit, a mean-
ing which it does not have in the other Community languages.6 2
In addition, the term submit is used in the Regulation only where compli-
ance with an investigation ordered by decision is involved.63 Its use makes
it clear that the business cannot then refuse the investigation, but must
accept it. Nevertheless, this does not clarify the question of whether a
search may be carried out. However, a clear pointer to the duty to cooper-
ate is contained in Article 14(2), which stipulates that the books, etc.,
requested must be produced in complete form, thus requiring active collab-
oration; and in Article 14(l)(c), since oral explanations cannot be provided
'See Grutzner, op. cit., at 117, point 222.
"'See Deringer, op. cit., note 9; VAN DAMME, EUROPEES KARTELRECHT, 1969, at 262 el seq.;
WEYER, WRP, 1961, at 61, 65 et seq.
"
2These use the expressions "se soumettre," "Duldung," "sottoporsi," "zich te onderwerpen"
and "pligt til at underkaste sig."
63See Article 14(3), Article 15(1)(c) and Article 16(I)(d).
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unless there is cooperation on the part of the business. 64
The Commission confirmed this view (that Article 14 requires businesses
to cooperate in investigations) in its Decision of December 20, 1976.65 In
this case, a fine was imposed pursuant to Article 15(1)(c) because, in an
investigation based on written authorization, the business did not produce
the required records in complete form. The business argued in its defense
that it had fulfilled the obligation to produce records in complete form,
since its representative had stated that all of the company's books and busi-
ness records were available to the Commission officials but that these same
officials had then failed to examine the administrative archives.
The Commission rejected this argument. It pointed out that the obliga-
tion to produce documents must be taken to mean not merely the granting
of access to all the records, but rather the obligation to actually produce all
the requested documents and records. The objection that the Commission
officials had omitted to examine the administrative archives was not
accepted because none of the business' representatives had pointed out that
the records requested were kept in a place not immediately obvious as a
place for storing papers of this kind. The question of the duty to cooperate
may be of lesser importance where investigations based on written authori-
zation are involved, since here the consent of the business in the investiga-
tion procedure must first have been given and it can therefore be
anticipated that the business will not evade its duty to cooperate. But it
does become a question of considerable practical importance in cases where
the investigation has been ordered by decision in the face of opposition by
the business and where, for example, the business records are kept in
numerous premises, possibly covering several stories of an office block.
Clearly, searches could not, at any rate in such cases, ensure that the pur-
pose of the investigation was attained since the Commission has no auxil-
iary officials available and no right of seizure.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission does not have a right of
search cannot mean that the Commission officials must sit waiting in some
conference room in the business to see whether any of the documents
requested are going to be produced to them and, if so, which ones.
Rather, in order to attain the purpose of the investigation, it may be nec-
essary for the Commission officials, in accordance with their right of entry,
to see for themselves whether certain records are available. The broadly
worded terms of Article 14(l)(d) of Regulation No. 17 make it clear that
Commission officials have right of access to all parts of a business in which
business records are usually or actually kept.6 6 The manner in which this
'This view is also taken by Mestmacker, op. cit., at 607; GLEISS & HIRSCH, op. cit., at 512,
point 35; GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 951; MAILANDER, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOM-
MENTARY, Op. cit., note 88. With regard to the duty to cooperate in the context of the right of
investigation pursuant to Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty, see judgment of Dec. 16, 1963, Case
18/62, Barge v. High Authority, [ECRI 1963 at 278: "It is for the business concerned to enable
the High Authority to carry out its duties by voluntarily furnishing it with the information it
needs."6
'See OJ L 75, Mar. 21, 1980 (Fabbrica Pisana).
66See GLEISS & HIRSCH, op. cit., at 512, point 36.
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occurs depends on the circumstances in each individual case. As a rule, the
access demanded by the officials is confined to certain premises where
records which it is necessary to check are presumed to be kept. Since the
completeness of the business records to be examined must not be jeopard-
ized through intentional or unintentional removal or indeed the destruction
of individual documents of particular importance, it is in certain circum-
stances essential that the Commission's officials should be present on the
relevant business premises until the conclusion of the inspection.
C. Investigations Ordered by Decision
Article 14(3) of Regulation No. 17 states that businesses and business
associations shall submit to investigations orderd by decision of the
Commission.
1. Investigations ordered by decision represent the most severe form of
intervention in the business and industrial world since businesses no longer
have the right to refuse to cooperate in investigations and, if they do refuse,
they can be compelled to fulfill their legal obligations either with the assist-
ance of the Member States as provided for in Article 14(6) or through the
imposition of periodic penalty payments as provided for in Article 16(1)(d)
of Regulation No. 17.
Although the decision can be contested by instituting proceedings under
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, such proceedings do not have suspensory
effect, as the first sentence of Article 185 of the EEC Treaty makes clear,
with the result that the business must initially accept the investigation. The
Court of Justice can of course order that application of the contested deci-
sion be suspended "if it considers that circumstances so require" (second
sentence of Article 185 of the EEC Treaty). However, so far there have
been no decisions by the Court of Justice on the question of suspension in
cases under Article 14(3) of Regulation No. 17.67
2. Up to 1978, the Commission only rarely exercised its power to order
investigations by decision.68 This situation has changed since 1979. In that
year, thirty decisions were made.69 Of these, no less than twenty-one inves-
tigations related to inquiries in one particular case; the other nine related to
three other investigative procedures. 70 In 1980, twenty decisions7 1 were
"
7 The Court of Justice dealt with the question of suspension in connection with a procedure
under the ECSC Treaty; see the President's decision not to grant a suspension, June 26, 1959,
in Case 31/59/ R (Brescia), [1960] ECR 98.
"See unpublished Decisions of July 3, 1967, (IV/6), June 10, 1970 (IV/26.811-815) and
Apr. 29, 1974 (IV/AF 256) and Decision of Dec. 8, 1977 (Freiformschmieden), OJ L 10 Jan.
13, 1978.
"See Written Question No. 677/79 of Oct. 4, 1979, OJ C 310, Dec. 10, 1979, at 30 et seq.70See unpublished Decisions of June 22, 1979 (IV/AF 420), Dec. 11, 1979 (IV/28.627), Feb.
23, 1979 (IV/AF 379) and Mar. 13, 1979 (IV/AF 407 and the Decisions of Jan. 31, 1979
(Fides), OJ L 57, Mar. 8, 1979, and of July 6, 1979 (AM & S Europe Ltd), OJ L 199, Aug. 7,
1979.7 See unpublished Decisions of June 17, 1980 (IV/29.895), June 24, 1980 (IV/30.064), Nov.
26, 1980 (IV/AF 465), Nov. 27, 1980 (IV/AF 468) and Nov. 28, 1980 (IV/AF 457).
46 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
made, relating to five different investigations. In 1981 five decisions were
made, related to one particular case.7 2 However, the increase since 1979 in
the exercise of these powers provided for in Article 14(3) is probably due
not so much to a change in the legal attitude toward this means of investiga-
tion as to other reasons.
The case law of the Court of Justice shows what strict requirements are
imposed upon the Commission to provide sufficient evidence. Up to the
end of 1981, the Court of Justice had to deal with 28 cases in which actions
had been brought to have Commission decisions pursuant to Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty declared void. In 7 cases, insufficient findings of
fact or lack of proper evidence led either to annulment of the decision (as in
the Continental Can73 and Kai 74 cases), cancellation of the fines imposed
by the Commission (as in the Papiers Peints De Belgique case, 75 or a reduc-
tion in fines (as in the International Quinine Agreement,76 European Sugar
Industry,77 United Brands,78 and Hoffman La Roche-Vitamins79 cases).
This shows that the outcome of Court proceedings is largely dependent on
the thoroughness with which the relevant facts of the case have been estab-
lished. Thus, in many important cases, the chances of success of any proce-
dure which the Commission wishes to pursue are determined at the
investigation stage. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that
the scale and duration of investigations are all that matter.
In practice, investigations serve primarily to uncover violations of the
competition law. The success of an investigation frequently depends on
rapid and unexpected access to the evidence available, access which the
right to information does not guarantee. 80 Such access is ensured by deci-
sions ordering investigations. These decisions do not depend on whether
the Commission has already gathered information or has unsuccessfully
attempted to carry out an ordinary investigation. Nor must the investiga-
tion be announced in advance.8' The use of surprise is a legitimate means
of achieving success in investigating a business. Surprise is always essential
where the possibility exists that the business concerned will attempt to
thwart the purpose of the inquiry by removing or destroying records. Possi-
"See unpublished Decisions of Feb. 13, 1981 (IV/AF 487).
"Judgment of Feb. 21, 1973, Case 6/72 [1975] ECR 215, 247 et seq.
74Judgment of May 14, 1975, Joined Cases 19 and 20/74 11975] ECR, 499, 519 el seq.
7Judgment of May 26, 1975 Case 73/74 [1975] ECR, 1491, 1515 et seq.
'
6Judgments of July 15, 1970, Cases 41, 44 and 45/69 [1970] ECR, 661, 698 et seq. ; 733, 759
el seq. and 769, 805 et seq.
"Judgment of Dec. 16, 1975, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-66, 111, 113 and 114/73 [1975]
ECR, 1663, 1969 el seq., 1985 el seq., 2004 et seq.
7"Judgment of Feb. 14, 1978, Case 27/76 [1978] ECR, 208, 303 el seq.
"Judgment of Feb. 13, 1979, Case 85/76 [1979] ECR, 461, 557.
IOSee GROEBEN, BOECKH & THIESING, at 949.
"See Judgment of June 26, 1980 (National Panasonic) supra.
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ble grounds for this sort of approach might include the duration and gravity
of a suspected violation, the extent to which agreements are kept secret, or
the suspicion that existing agreements have been notified to the Commis-
sion wrongly or incompletely or that unfair practices which had already
been the subject of an inquiry have been resumed. Experience during
recent years has shown that businesses have developed more refined ways
of restricting competition. The classic form of cartel agreement is becoming
less and less common. It has been replaced by other arrangements and
procedures for achieving the desired objective, such as telephone conversa-
tions in which code words are used, encoded memos, the practice of ensur-
ing that only a few middle management employees have knowledge of the
scheme, communicating via third parties in countries inside or outside the
Community, hotel meetings, so-called penthouse conversations, etc. Simi-
larly, ways have been developed of filing incriminating documents incon-
spicuously and of "laundering" business papers if there is time to do so.
The number of documents used is at the same time kept as small as possi-
ble. In all these instances, investigations, however long and thorough, bring
little or nothing to light if the initial measures have proved unsuccessful.
What is important, therefore, is not to increase the quantity of investiga-
tions, but to improve the effectiveness of specific measures taken in individ-
ual cases. In certain circumstances, therefore, only a mandatory
investigation ordered by decision will achieve what is desired. In such
cases, preliminary inquiries involving a simple authorization would either
jeopardize the purpose of the investigation or would actually thwart it.
3. Decisions ordering investigations must specify the subject matter and
purpose of the investigation, assign the date on which it is to begin, and
indicate the possible penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(c) and Article
16(l)(d) of Regulation No. 17 and the right to have the decision reviewed
by the Court of Justice (second sentence of Article 14(3) of Regulation No.
17).
The decision is generally notified by being handed over immediately
before the investigation is to begin to the business concerned by the Com-
mission officials authorized to carry out the investigation. Minutes are
taken of this. The Commission officials prove their identity by producing a
written authorization to implement the decision. The business is free to
decide whether or not it wishes to call in lawyers. Problems could arise
where the business asks that the investigation be postponed until its lawyer
is present. However, the legality of the investigation does not depend on
whether the business has its lawyer present.8 2 Consequently, the Commis-
sion officials will agree to such a request only if it appears possible that a
lawyer can be summoned within a reasonable period of time and if there is
no reason to fear that the purpose of the investigation will be jeopardized
by waiting. In other respects, investigations ordered by decision follow the
2See Case 136/79 (National Panasonic) [1980] ECR.
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same course as those based on written authorization, (see the description
given above.)
IV. Relations with the Member States
Commission investigations are carried out in constant contact with the
relevant national authorities. 83 This is laid down in Regulation No. 17 and
has proved to be not only necessary, but useful.
A closer look as the rules laid down in Regulation No. 17 shows that
none of the Commission's investigative procedures is carried out without
the participation, or at least information of the national authorities.
A. Requestsfor Information
When sending a request for information to a business or a business asso-
ciation, the Commission must at the same time forward a copy of the
request to the competent authority in whose territory the seat of the busi-
ness or business association is situated (Article 11(2)). The same applies
where the Commission requests information by decision (Article 11(6)).
B. Investigation by the Commission
Whenever the Commission intends to carry out an investigation, it must
inform the competent national authority of the Member State in whose ter-
ritory the investigation is to be made of the business in question and the
main grounds for suspicion. In good time before the investigation, the
Commission must outline the necessary details of the investigation and
must name the officials responsible for carrying it out (Article 14(2)).
Before the Commission orders an investigation by decision pursuant to
Article 14(3), it must consult the competent national authorities (Article
14(4)).
The usual procedure is to send the draft of the decision to the relevant
national authority for comment. The Commission is not bound by the
authority's opinion, since decisions to order investigations must be made
after consultation, but not necessarily in agreement, with the national
authority; the Commission will, however, take due account of any misgiv-
ings or objections expressed. This is necessary if only because any such
decision must be implemented in collaboration with the national authority.
This requirement derives basically from Article 14(5), which provides
that officials of the national authority may, at the Commission's request or
at the national authority's own initiative, assist Commission officials in car-
rying out their duties. National officials may be present at both investiga-
tions involving authorizations and those ordered by decision. In the case of
investigations ordered by decision, most Member States make use of the
"The relevant national authorities for this purpose are the "competent authorities of the
Member States" designated by the governments to the Commission pursuant to Article 10.
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right to have their own officials accompany the Commission officials. For
investigations involving authorizations, some Member States do so only
where the national authority considers the case to be particularly important
or where the Directorate-General for Competition has requested the partic-
ipation of national officials.
The presence of national officials frequently provides valuable assistance
to the Commission officials. It also reassures the business concerned that
domestic laws and customs are being observed, and allows the national
authority to have direct knowledge of the course and findings of the
investigation.
In the case of investigations ordered by decision, the participation of
national officials is particularly important where business opposes the
investigation. In such instances, the Member State must afford the Com-
mission officials the necessary assistance to enable them to make their
investigation (first sentence of Article 14(6)). The key factor is whether and
to what extent the Member States have made arrangements for applying
direct enforcement so as to compel a business to submit immediately to an
investigation ordered by the Commission. The legal situation in the Mem-
ber States in this respect is not uniform. In the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, the law makes
express reference to the possibility of calling the police.
8 4
In Belgium, there is no such express provision;8 5 however, it must be
borne in mind that the officials of the "Inspection generale economique,"
which is the body responsible for assisting the Commission pursuant to
Article 14(6), themselves have police powers. In Denmark, the situation is
different. The Danish implementing law8 6 provides that business must sub-
mit to an investigation ordered by Commission decision.
If they refuse, direct enforcement may be applied only on the basis of a
court order. However, the necessary order is issued without further ado
where there has been violation of a requirement, clearly formulated in the
law, to submit to an investigation.
For this purpose, the Danish implementing law expressly states that busi-
nesses must submit to investigation decisions taken by the Commission.
Notwithstanding Article 25(9) of Regulation No. 17, which sets a time
limit of six months from the date of accession, the United Kingdom and
Ireland have not yet taken any measures to implement Article 14(6). The
argument advanced so far is that it is sufficient to rely on the courts in
enforcing investigation decisions, since the courts can order any uncoopera-
-Federal Republic of Germany: Section 3 of the Gesetz zur Ausfuhrung der Verordnung Nr.
17 of Aug. 17, 1967 as amended up to March 2, 1974 (BGBI. 1. p. 469); France: Article 4 of
Decret No. 72-151 of Feb. 18, 1972 (Journal Offliciel, 2.25/72); Italy: Article 8 of Decreto del
Presidente della Repubblica No. 1884 of Sept. 22, 1963 (Giornale Ufficiale, Jan. 11, 1964); Lux-
emburg: Article 3 of the Rbglemeni grand-ducal of May 26, 1965 (Memorial A No. 31, June 15,
1965); Netherlands: Article 4 of the Wei van July 10, 1968 (Stbld. at 395).
"Belgium, "Arrete Royal" of Jan. 18, 1966 (Moniteur belge No. 16, Jan. 22, 1966 at 759).
"Denmark: Article 2.3 of Lov Nr 505 of Nov. 29, 1972.
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tive business to refrain from removing or destroying documents or to sub-
mit to the investigation. Though this does not give the authorities the right
to apply direct enforcement, any failure by a business to comply with a
court order would be a punishable offense (contempt of court). The proce-
dures in this respect are the same in England and Wales; similar procedures
apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The consultations on this matter
between the Commission on the one hand and the United Kingdom and
Ireland on the other have not yet been concluded. Greece became a Mem-
ber State of the European Community in 1981 but has not yet taken the
necessary measures to implement Article 14(6).
C. Investigations by the Authorities of the Member States
Article 13 of Regulation No. 17 provides that the Commission may
request the competent authorities of the Member States to undertake inves-
tigations which it considers to be necessary under Article 14(1), or which it
has ordered by decision pursuant to Article 14(3). This provision is a clear
illustration of the principle of cooperation between the Commission and the
Member States in investigative procedures. The argument that the Com-
mission, pursuant to Article 13, should have investigations carried out pri-
marily by the Member States87 cannot be accepted, since neither the
wording of, nor the relationship between, Articles 13 and 14 indicate that
either is subsidiary to the other; they offer two different powers of investiga-
tion of which the Commission can make equal use. Of course, since the
Directorate-General for competition has only a small number of staff avail-
able,8 8 it would make sense for the Commission to avail itself more of this
power. Yet Article 13 has not attained any practical significance. The nec-
essary legal and technical arrangements are available, for at least the origi-
nal six Member States, in the legislation introduced in implementation of
Article 14(6), have made provisions giving them the necessary power of
examination in the event a request is made pursuant to Article 13.89 The
same is also true of Denmark. Only in the United Kingdom, Ireland and
Greece is the situation different. The problems are therefore not so much of
a legal as of a practical nature.
In the great majority of cases, Commission investigative procedures are
international in scope, at least where it is suspected that trade between
Member States is being affected. This means that investigations must be
carried out in two or more Member States, so that several national authori-
ties would have to be involved since their powers are confined to their
respective territories. It must be borne in mind here that the staffing
arrangements and structures of the individual national authorities differ
8
VSee SCHLIEDER, BB 1962, at 305; Deringer, Regulation No. 17, Article 13, Note 2 and
Article 14, Note 2.
"Approximately 20 officials in Directorate A, which is responsible for inspection and docu-
mentation, spend most of their time working on investigations pursuant to Regulation No. 17.9See the above mentioned national laws (footnotes 84-86).
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widely. Larger authorities such as the Federal Cartel Office in Germany or
the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (including the Department of
Prices and Consumer Protection) have over 200 officials; while other
authorities, such as the French "Direction Nationale d'Enquete" or the Bel-
gian "Inspection Generale Economique," have much fewer staff. Obvi-
ously, the less well staffed authorities would be much less able to provide
official assistance.
Inevitably, therefore, the application of Article 13 would be uneven.
There are in any case grounds for fearing that the results of any such inves-
tigations would differ according to the competition policy of the individual
Member States. This could result in discrimination. For example, in the
case of multinational companies it would inevitably provoke opposition on
the part of the businesses concerned and would create legal uncertainty.
The applicability of Article 13 therefore remains restricted to exceptional
cases and does not afford the Commission any noticeable relief in the ful-
fillment of its tasks.
D. Inquiries into Sectors of the Economy
Inquiries into sectors of the economy pursuant to Article 12 of Regula-
tion No. 17 are similarly based on the principle of close and constant col-
laboration with the Member States. This is not only because the provisions
concerning requests to supply information and concerning investigations
apply to those inquiries, but also because before adopting its decision to
initiate an inquiry, the Commission must obtain the opinion of the Advi-
sory Committee Restrictive Practices and Monopolies (Article 12(4), in con-
junction with Article 10(3) to (6) of Regulation No. 17).
So far, Article 12 has been applied in only two cases 90 and has therefore
similarly proved to be of little practical importance in investigations.
E. Advisory Committee
Important instances in which collaboration of the national authorities is
specifically required are those where the Commission must impose sanc-
tions in connection with investigative procedures. This applies both to the
provisions concerning fines (Article 15) and to those concerning periodic
penalty payments (Article 16). In both cases, Commission decisions may be
taken only if the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monop-
olies9 ' has been consulted (Article 15(3) and Article 16(3) in conjunction
"See the inquiry in the margarine sector, Fourth General Report 1970, at 320, and the
inquiry into the market for beer, e.g., information decisions of June 18, 1971 OJ L 161, July 19,
1971 at 2, 6 and 32.
9 The Advisory Committee is composed of officials competent in the matter of restrictive
practices and monopolies. Each Member State appoints an official, usually high ranking
(often the head of the competent national cartel authority), to represent it. If that official is
prevented from attending, he may be replaced by another official (Article 10(4) of Regulation
No. 17).
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with Article 10(3) to (6)). The Commission has rarely had occasion to
impose fines for violations against its investigative powers;92 no decisions
have yet been made imposing periodic penalty payments. The reason for
this is probably that businesses as a rule have fulfilled their duty to supply
information and to cooperate. On the other hand, there is no denying the
fact that violations have been suspected in many cases, though they could
not be proved.
Since, on the one hand, the Commission has powers of sanction only
against businesses and not against the natural persons acting on their
behalf, and since, on the other hand, it has no right to examine witnesses,
either on oath or otherwise, the figure for unprovable violations is probably
relatively high. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that Article 15 provides
only a modest range of fines.93 In the Decision of July 28, 1971 the Com-
mission imposed a fine of 4.000 units of account. In the seven other deci-
sions taken since then, e.g, on December 20, 1979 (Fabbrica Pisana and
Fabbrica Lastre di Vetro Pietro Sciarra), on November 17, 1981 (C CI), on
November 25, 1981 (Telos). On December 11, 1981 (National Panasonic
Belgium andN.P. France) and October 27, 1982 (I.N.I.C.F.) it imposed the
maximum fine of 5.000 units of account. Since Article 15 provides for a
range of possible sanctions and since, according to general legal principles,
the maximum fine should apply only to the most serious cases, very much
lower fines should frequently be imposed when decisions are made. It goes
without saying that such sanctions would scarcely be felt by the large busi-
nesses that are mostly involved in Commission procedures. Sensitivity to
sanctions could be extended to the sphere of procedural violations only if
significantly higher fines could be imposed. In these circumstances, it is
doubtful whether, from the point of view of either retribution or prevention,
the threat of fines under Article 15 is at all an appropriate means of getting
businesses to fulfill their duty to cooperate.
F. Information from the Member States
An important practical aspect of investigation is the question of the
extent to which the Commission can request information from the Member
States. Article 223(l)(a) of the EEC Treaty lays down the right under Com-
munity law to refuse to provide information. It stipulates that no Member
State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it con-
siders contrary to the essential interests of its security. This right of refusal,
however, is unlikely to prove of any practical significance, since the Com-
92See unpublished Decision of July 29, 1971 (IV/26.918 bis); Decisions of Dec. 20, 1979
(Fabbrica Pisana and Fabbrica Lastre de Vetro Pietro Sciarra), OJ L 75, Mar. 21, 1980; Deci-
sion of Nov. 17, 1981 (Comptoirs Commercial d'Importation-C.C.I.) OJ L. 27, Feb. 4, 1982;
Decision of Nov. 25, 1981 (Telos), OJ L 58, Mar. 2, 1982; unpublished Decisions of Dec. 1I,
1981 (IV/AF 511 and 512).
9 Under Article 15(i), the Commission may impose on businesses or business associations
fines of 100 to 5.000 units of account where they fail to comply with their duty to cooperate
pursuant to Articles 11, 12, 13 or 14.
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mission will not undertake any investigation liable to damage the essential
interests of a Member State's security.
However, a question of practical importance is whether there is a conflict
between the Commission's right to information on the one hand and
national laws on the protection of secrets on the other, such a conflict could
restrict the Commission's investigative powers in competition cases.
Most Member States have provisions governing the protection of secrets
by persons in public office.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, Section 203 of the
"Strafgesetzbuch" (Penal Code) was amended on January 1, 1975. It now
stipulates that it is a punishable offense for a person holding public office to
disclose without authorization a secret of a third party, in particular an
industrial or business secret, which has been entrusted to him or has other-
wise come to his knowledge. For the purpose of this provision, secrets
include personal or factual information that has been obtained in an official
capacity.
However, the law does not prevent such information from being passed
on to other authorities.
In France, Article 10(1) of "Ordonnance No. 59-244" of February 4,
1959, in conjunction with Article 578 of the "Code Penal," prohibits civil
servants from passing on information and documents which they have
obtained in the pursuit of their duties.
In Italy, Article 621 of the "Codice Penale" stipulates that disclosing
secrets contained in public or private documents of third parties is a punish-
able offense where knowledge of them was obtained without authorization
and where the secrets were disclosed without due reason. The same applies,
pursuant to Article 326 of the "Codice Penale," where official secrets were
involved.
In The Netherlands, Article 272(1) of the "Wetboek van Strafrecht" in
quite general terms prohibits civil servants from revealing secrets.
In Belgium and Luxembourg, similar rules apply under Article 458 of the
"Code Penal." This stipulates that it is a punishable offense for the State or
the persons charged by it with the safeguarding of secrets to reveal the
secrets entrusted to them.
In the United Kingdom, Section 1(2) of the Official Secrets Act of 1920
requires civil servants to safeguard secrets, though it does allow that there
might be grounds for justifying disclosure of a secret.
In Denmark, Section 264(b) of the Penal Code prohibits persons in pub-
lic office from disclosing secrets. This rule is supplemented by a number of
administrative provisions. In Greece Art. 252 of the Penal Code (Act No.
1492 of 1950) stipulates that it is a punishable offense if a civil servant dis-
closes information or documents which has been obtained in an official
capacity and if this disclosure is from selfish motives or against the interest
of the State or a third party.
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In the light of the Member States' legal provisions concerning the protec-
tion of secrets, it must be asked whether the governments and the compe-
tent national authorities may refuse to supply information and documents
which the Commission requests in the exercise of its investigative powers
pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation No. 17. The answer to this question is
of major significance, since the officials of national authorities cannot be
expected to provide the Commission with knowledge obtained officially
unless they are sure of sufficient legal protection against the possible charge
of having violated national penal provisions.
The basic principle in such cases should be the proper correlation
between Community law and national law. The focus should be not so
much on the aspect of possible conflict, but rather on the method to be
developed to ensure effective interaction of Community law with national
legal systems for the purposes of applying, enforcing and implementing
Community law.94
Examining the ranking of national rules (for example, in accordance with
hierarchical criteria or the criterion of lex posterior) in relation to Commu-
nity law would not be of any help. Rather, the key consideration should be
that the Community's responsibilities in the area in question could not be
fulfilled without unrestricted mutual cooperation with the Member States.
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty states the following:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measures
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty provides that the Community's tasks
include the institution ofa system ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted.
This principle is reflected in Article 87 and in Regulation No. 17 adopted
pursuant to it. In order to ensure that the Commission could carry out the
tasks thus allotted to it, the Regulation accorded the Commission the right
to obtain information from the Member States, a right which can be refused
only in instances covered by Article 223 of the EEC Treaty.
Otherwise, the Member States should provide information on all facts of
which they have in an official capacity obtained knowledge, even if they are
bound to secrecy under domestic law. This is because the cooperation
requirement laid down in Article 11 of Regulation No. 17 is matched by the
secrecy requirement specifically imposed on the Commission and its offi-
cials by Article 214 of the EEC Treaty and, in the area of competition law,
by Article 20 of Regulation No. 17. Both these requirements complement
94See Justice Pescatore, Das Zusammenwirken der Gemeinschaftsrechisordnung mi den
nationalen Rechlsordnungen (concluding lecture at the FIDE Congress in Berlin 1970), EUR
1970, at 307.
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one another and thus give effect to the principle of joint operation between
Community law and national legal systems.
If differently formulated national rights of refusal were accepted, this
would contradict the direct and uniform application of Community law and
would inevitably lead to discrimination in the Commission's exercise of its
investigative powers.9"
V. Criticism
The criticisms expressed in public are directed at the Commission's pro-
cedures as a whole; that is to say, their targets include hearings on matters
to which the Commission has taken objection, hearings which, pursuant to
Article 19 of Regulation No. 17, must precede any decisions taken. The
following commenr- however, will be confined to the question of whether
the criticism of the investigative procedures is justified.
A. Lack of Legal Protection
It is argued that the provisions governing the powers of inquiry, in partic-
ular the right of investigation, are unbalanced, unfair and sometimes
incomprehensible. At the same time, greater legal protection is demanded
for businesses involved in inquiries and investigations.
Like other provisions of Community law, Regulation No. 17 represents a
compromise solution. It cannot equal national legal systems in all its provi-
sions. The procedures laid down in Regulation No. 17 do not have the
force of criminal law. This can be seen from the wording of Article 15(4),
which states that decisions imposing fines are not of a criminal nature. This
provision makes it quite clear that the intention in adopting the Regulation
was to give proceedings in competition cases an administrative character
and to keep them out of the area of criminal law.96
The purpose of the powers of investigation laid down in Regulation No.
17 is to allow the Commission to acquire objective and reliable knowledge
of the facts in order to enable it to carry out the tasks allotted to it in the
area of competition policy. These powers do not include the rights of
search 97 or seizure; nor can the Commission examine witnesses, on oath or
otherwise. It thus has substantially fewer investigative powers than most of
the cartel authorities in Member States of the Community or in other dem-
ocratic countries.
"This conclusion is also reached by Mestmacker, op. cit., at 601; GROBEN, BOECKH &
THIESING, at 926; a different view is given by Wohlfarth, in Wurdinger & Wohlfarth at 32;
Deringer, op. cit., note 14; GLEISS & HIRSCH, op. cit., art. 11, note 5 takes the purpose of the
domestic protective provisions as the key criterion and, in cases of doubt, allows the right to
refuse to supply information.
'See Van der Esch, Due Process in the Administrative Application of European Communities'
Competition Rules, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CONCURRENCE No. 141, February
1980, at 9.
"See the comments above under III(2)(e)(4).
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Investigation and inquiry procedures are based primarily on the volun-
tary cooperation of the businesses concerned. This is evident from the pro-
visions governing requests for information and investigations based on
written authorization. To argue that the voluntary nature of such coopera-
tion is limited since the Commission can circumvent refusals would be to
forget that investigations carried out on a voluntary basis are already sub-
ject to strict legal requirements which the Commission cannot evade by
attempting to impose mandatory orders.
Where the Commission considers it appropriate to order an investigation
by decision, numerous legal guarantees are provided on behalf of the busi-
nesses concerned:
1. Commission officials may not carry out inquiries without written
authorization;
2. businesses are required to submit to investigations only on the basis of
a formal Commission decision;
3. such decisions may not be made until the competent national author-
ity of the relevant Member State has been consulted; the decisions
must be properly substantiated and must inform the parties of the
legal possibilities of contesting the decision;
4. if the decision is successfully contested, any records which the Com-
mission has obtained during the investigation may not be used;
5. the Court of Justice may suspend the application of a contested deci-
sion, if it considers that circumstances so require; and
6. fines or periodic penalty payments where the relevant business fails to
cooperate may be imposed only in a further formal Commission deci-
sion, prior to which the business and the Advisory Committee must be
heard.
In view of this legal situation, the relationship between public power and
private interests seems balanced and appropriate to the requirements of the
rule of law. In this context, it should not be forgotten that, of the sixty-nine
investigation decisions adopted by the Commission up to December 1982,
only two were contested on the grounds that the investigative procedure did
not take due account of the requirements of the rule of law.9 8
It is difficult to see how demands for additional guarantees of legal pro-
tection could be met without diluting the Commission's powers in this area
and ultimately making them ineffective. This would not be in the Commu-
nity's interest, which is to ensure that the system of competition laid down
in the Treaty is maintained.
"In the National Panasonic case, the Court of Justice rejected the appeal. In the AM & S
Europe Ltd. case, the question at issue is legal privilege. See judgment of May 18, 1982 (case
155/79).
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B. Additional Monitoring Agency
The Damseaux Report recommended that the competition procedures
followed by the Commission should be simplified in order to maintain the
credibility and effectiveness of competition policy.99 This recommendation
reflects the general awareness that the discovery of violations of the law
may have a preventive effect not so much through Draconian measures as
through speedy action by the administrative authorities. The same is true
for Community competition policy.
The Commission will be all the more effective the more rapidly it is able
to react to distortions of competition. Establishing the relevant facts plays
an important role here. If the Commission were enabled to reach reliable
findings more rapidly, this would also serve the interests of the businesses
concerned, not only in cases involving, for example, plans to set up Joint
Ventures, but also in cases involving the prohibition of unfair practices or
the imposition of fines. The undue length of procedures is disadvantageous
to the businesses concerned, and from other perspectives as well, because it
causes legal uncertainty and entails avoidable costs.1° °
The suggestion that the results of inquiries by the Directorate-General
for Competition should be checked once again by an independent
agency' 0 seems to contradict the recommendation of the European Parlia-
ment. It is difficult to see how Commission procedures could be speeded up
by involving an additional agency. We may leave aside here the question
of whether the agency should be in the form of a newly created court (possi-
bly for the purpose of relieving the burden on the Court of Justice), an
independent administrative authority, or another Commission department
independent of the Directorate-General for Competition. This would be a
legal and political question requiring changes in the EEC Treaty or in the
regulations adopted pursuant to it. Rather, the key question is whether an
additional instance might be necessary to control investigative procedures
in the light of the requirements of the rule of law and to protect the busi-
nesses affected.
In this connection the judgment of the Court of Justice in the case of
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) v. Commission of 11 November
1981 should not be overlooked,' 0 2 though the main issues of this case were
not questions of the investigatory powers of the Commission, since IBM
claimed in its application that the act of the Commission by which a pro-
ceeding was initiated against IBM pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No.
17 and the statement of objections pursuant to Article 19 of the said Regu-
lation should be declared void.
"See supra note 1.
'"As an extreme example, see the six-year dispute between the U.S. Justice Department and
the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (costing U.S. $350-$500 million) or the
IBM case; see BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at 63.
'See note 8.
'"
2Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission, Nov. 11, 1981 (not yet reported).
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The application was founded on (but not limited to) the submission that
the statement of objections signals the termination, by an authoritative act
which determines the Commission attitude, of the internal administrative
phase of the preliminary inquiry, and thus amounts to a decision within the
meaning of Article 173 of the Treaty.
In support of its submission IBM relied further on the special circum-
stances of the case, claiming that a judicial review ought to be made avail-
able at an early stage in this case both in accordance with the principles of
international law in such matters and pursuant to general principles flowing
from the laws of the Member States.
With regard to this argument, the Court said, that it was not necessary for
the purposes of this case to decide "whether, in exceptional circumstances,
where the measures concerned lack even the appearance of legality, a judi-
cial review at an early stage such as that envisaged by IBM may be consid-
ered compatible with the system of remedies provided for in the Treaty."
In this instance, the Court said, adequate legal protection for IBM did
not require that the measures in question, e.g. the initiation of a formal
procedure and the statement of objections, be subject to immediate review.
If the Commission were to adopt a decision which affects IBM's interest,
that decision would, in accordance with Article 173 of the Treaty, be subject
to judicial review. It would then be for the Court to decide whether any-
thing unlawful has been done in the course of the administrative procedure.
The application therefore was dismissed as inadmissible. With regard to
the investigative procedures the conclusion could be drawn from this judg-
ment of the Court in the IBM case, that the Court would consider early
judicial review of investigation measures as compatible with the legal sys-
tem established by the Treaty and Regulation No. 17 only in exceptional
circumstances, especially where the measures concerned lack even the
appearance of legality.
It follows that the question of necessity or even utility of additional
administrative stages to control investigative procedures has not been
answered. Considerations of that kind are prompted by the criticism that
the Commission should not simultaneously play the role of investigator,
prosecutor and judge. This sort of criticism, however, is too facile and is
not borne out by the actual legal situation and by the practice followed in
competition procedures.
The Commission is not a judge in its own cause, because, in its formal
activities, it is always subject to control by the Court of Justice. 10 3 Further-
more, it must not be forgotten that it is entirely within the continental Euro-
pean legal tradition for an administrative authority to combine
investigative and decision-making powers. As far as competition law is
"°
3See also the Judgment of the Court of Justice of Oct. 29, 1980 (Fedetab), Joined Cases
209-215/78 and 218/78, OJ C 320, Dec. 9, 1980. Here the Court of Justice underlined the
administrative character of Commission procedures in competition cases and confirmed that
the Commission is not a court.
EEC Investigation Procedures 59
concerned, the Federal Cartel Office in Germany is a good example of this.
The wide-ranging nature of the Commission's powers does not seem to be
questioned in the matter of agreements, decisions and practices for which
the relevant businesses wish to obtain an exemption under Article 85(3) of
the EEC Treaty, even though in this case also investigative and decision-
making powers are combined in one body. In point of fact, accusations of
undue accumulation of powers are probably more a reflection of the fear of
overweening bureaucracy and arbitrariness. Many critics obviously pre-
sume that the Commission officials charged with competition cases carry
out their duties without the necessary objectivity and that they are not sub-
ject to sufficient control in the exercise of their powers.
However, this is not borne out by the procedures actually followed by the
Commission. It is true that, in formal legal terms, there is no distinction
between investigative and decision-making procedures, since it is the Com-
mission or the Directorate-General for Competition itself which carries out
these tasks. In point of fact, however, there are so many dividing lines and
checks and balances within the Commission that the lack of formal distinc-
tion is of no practical significance.
Within the Directorate-General for Competition, responsibility for inves-
tigative procedures lies with Directorate A. Functionally and in terms of
staff, Directorate A is separate from Directorates B and C, which are
responsible for hearings and decision-making procedures. Directorates B
and C have little influence on Directorate A's investigative procedures and
are equally little bound by its assessment of the factual findings. The offi-
cials responsible for establishing the facts of each case are therefore not the
same as those responsible for decisions.1°4
On all formal investigation measures and questions of principle, an opin-
ion is given by the department responsible for general competition policy,
which is directly attached to the Director-General and independent of the
other Directorates.
If Directorate A wishes to carry out investigations in a particular case, it
must obtain the prior authorization of the appropriate Member of the
Commission.
It is thus ensured, even at this stage, that investigative measures cannot
be carried out without the knowledge and consent of the Commission.
Before any decision is taken pursuant to Regulation No. 17, the Commis-
sion's Legal Service must be consulted, this applies both to investigative
measures and to the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments.
The Legal Service is completely independent of the Commission's other
departments in the exercise of its duties. If it does not agree with the meas-
ures proposed by the Directorate-General for Competition, only the Com-
mission itself can settle the conflict.
"This leaves aside the question of whether this is in fact an advantage, since it does not
make for greater speed in Commission procedures.
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This, together with the fact that the Legal Service represents the Commis-
sion where appeals are made to the Court of Justice against Commission
decisions, further ensures the objectivity and legality of investigative
procedures.
The relevant Member States participate directly in investigations or must
be consulted before they are carried out.
All these measures are not mere formalities, but are carried out with care-
ful and detailed consideration of the sometimes controversial points of view
involved.
This is done under the political control of the Member of the Commis-
sion responsible for competition questions-control which covers all aspects
of each case. The Commission in turn is answerable to the European
Parliament. 0 5
Thus, as far as the legal protection of businesses involved in investigative
procedures is concerned, there seems to be no need for additional monitor-
ing agencies.
'""See also answer to written question No. 814/82, given by Commissioner Andriessen, OJ C
259, Oct. 4, 1982 at 26.
